AFTER THE AXIS OF RESISTANCE
RECONFIGURING IRAN’S DETERRENCE
Deterrence is the strategic use of threats to prevent adversaries from taking undesirable actions. It relies on the perception that the costs of aggression will outweigh any potential gains, often through the promise of retaliation or unacceptable damage. In the context of statecraft, deterrence can be achieved through conventional military strength, missile capabilities, or the mere prospect of nuclear escalation. For decades, Iran has cultivated a deterrence posture rooted in asymmetric warfare, missile proliferation and a network of regional proxies – the so-called “Axis of Resistance” – stretching from Lebanon to Yemen. This apparatus has allowed Tehran to project power and deter both regional adversaries and external intervention, particularly from Israel and the United States. However, the Axis has recently shown signs of strain. From the Assad’s fall in Syria to the weakening of Hezbollah, Iran’s deterrent reach appears less effective than in the past. Is this really the case? What remains of Iranian deterrence? Can the Islamic Republic’s missile capabilities and nuclear ambiguity continue to serve as effective tools?
